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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress and the state legislatures have manifested their
increasing concern for environmental protection over the past several

years by focusing more attention on the punishment of those who
violate environmental protection requirements. Rather than seeking
to enforce environmental standards merely through civil penalties,
lawmakers have imposed criminal penalties, including fines and even
jail sentences, on those who violate environmental requirements, from
plant managers all the way up the ladder to corporate officers.'
Lawmakers and agency officials have not limited their efforts
to the conviction and punishment of environmental criminals, however. Many states have adopted so-called "bad actor" statutes that
allow state environmental agencies to consider an applicant's past
record of environmental compliance in determining whether to grant
an operating permit.2 By factoring a permit applicant's prior history
of environmental "citizenship" into the permit approval process, these
statutes 3 enable state officials to identify parties who have acted in
flagrant violation of environmental laws, and prevent continuing

See Thomas C. Green and James L. Connaughton, Defending Charges of
1.
Environmental Crime-The Growth Industry of the 90s, The Champion 14, 14-15 (April 1993).
Suzette Brooks, 'Bad Actor" Laws Snag Repeat Environmental Violators, Envir. L. in
2.
N.Y. 97, 97 (Aug. 1991).
At least twenty-one states have enacted bad actor laws. See, for example, 7 Del. Code
3.
Ann. §§ 7901-7905 (Supp. 1994); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4.02(6)-(10) (1993); Ind. Code
Ann. §§ 13-7-10.2-1 to -8 (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-3407(c) & (d) (1992);
Ky. Rev. Ann. Stat. § 224.40-330 (1991); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 299.518(4) & (6) (West Supp.
1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 115.076 (West Supp. 1995); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 17-17-501 to -507
(Law. Co-op Supp. 1994); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 260.205(16), 260.395(16) (Vernon 1990 & Supp.
1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:1E-126 to -135 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 74-44.2(D) & (E), 74-4-4.7 (1993); N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law § 27-0913(3) (McKinney 1984); N.D.
Cent. Code § 23-29-04 (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3734.41-.47 (Baldwin 1995); 27A
Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-7-109, 2-10-302 (West Supp. 1995); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6018.503(c) &
(d) (Purdon 1993); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10 (Supp. 1994); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-96-300 (Law.
Co-op Supp. 1993); S.D. Cod. Laws § 1-40-27 (Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-211-106(h),
68-212-218 (1992); Va. Code §§ 10.1-1408.1 to -1409 (1993). Note that some states list bad actor
provisions for solid and hazardous waste facilities separately in their codes.
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environmental degradation by denying those parties permits to
operate new polluting facilities.
While the apparent policy of environmental protection behind
these statutes is laudable, that policy is not the sole driving force
behind all bad actor laws. For example, New Jersey's bad actor law,
one of the first of its kind, and arguably a prototype relied upon by
other states, explicitly states that its primary goal is to curtail the
infiltration of organized crime into the state's waste industry. 4 In
pursuit of this goal, New Jersey's law does not focus solely on an applicant's history of compliance with environmental laws in determining whether an applicant qualifies as a bad actor under the law. In
fact, the law requires applicants to disclose, and provides for an investigation of, past criminal offenses entirely unrelated to environmental
laws, and mandates denial of an environmental permit even if the
applicant has been convicted of a crime unrelated to the environment.5 Further, New Jersey's bad actor statute holds permit applicants accountable for the bad acts of individuals affiliated with the
proposed facility, from key officers in the corporate structure to significant stockholders, parent companies, subsidiaries, and even persons considered to have a "beneficial interest" in the company. 6
New Jersey's bad actor law is clearly broader in scope than the
typical bad actor laws defined above. Given the unique nature of New
Jersey's problems with its waste handling industry, this distinction is
unsurprising.7 What is surprising is that many other state bad actor
laws, if not as broad in scope as New Jersey's law, share the New
Jersey law's focus on a wide range of criminal activity in identifying
bad actors. If states which have patterned their bad actor laws after
the broad New Jersey law do not have a similar problem with
organized crime, their laws may raise significant constitutional and
policy concerns. 8
This Note examines the design of bad actor laws, analyzing
how various states have crafted statutory requirements not only to
4.
N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 13:1E-126 (West 1991).
5.
Id. §§ 13:AE-127(e)(6), 13:1E-133(b) (West Supp. 1994).
6.
The statute provides for denial of a permit application if any of the relevant individuals has been convicted of specific offenses. See id. §§ 13:1E-127(e)(1), 13:AE-133(b).
7.
Investigations of New Jersey's waste industry from 1958 to 1970 revealed that
members of organized crime groups engaged in illegal disposal practices and other violations of
environmental standards in order to keep competition down and increase profits. James M.
Strock and Brian A. Runkel, EnvironmentalBad Actors and FederalDisqualification,15 Harv.
Envir. L. Rev. 529, 542 (1991).
8.
See Part III.
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"smoke out" undesirable permit applicants and prevent them from
obtaining operating permits, but also to accomplish other, and
sometimes questionable, goals. Part II of this Note begins with an
analysis of New Jersey's bad actor law and its policy underpinnings.
Part IIthen goes on to discuss how other states have followed or
diverged from the New Jersey model in adopting their own bad actor
laws. Part III examines both actual and proposed constitutional
challenges to overly broad bad actor laws and also suggests policy
concerns raised by such laws. This Part ultimately posits that problematic policy goals may underlie many bad actor statutes, and questions whether current bad actor statutes are appropriately designed
to accomplish the goal of increasing environmental compliance in the
regulated community. Part IV of this Note explains how bad actor
statutes might be drafted in order to avoid the constitutional and
policy concerns described in Part III. Part V contains a model bad
actor statute which incorporates the suggestions from Part IV.
II. STATE BAD ACTOR LAWS-AN OVERVIEW
Most "bad actor" statutes focus on applicants who wish to obtain permits to operate waste treatment facilities, rather than applicants for other types of environmental permits, such as air or water
pollution permits. 9 Commentators suggest that the waste treatment
industry draws environmental bad actors since it is a highly regulated
industry, thus guaranteeing
market participants high profits and
minimal competition. 10 Furthermore, most applicants for permits to
treat, store, dispose, or transport waste are in the business of waste
handling, whereas applicants for other types of state environmental
permits generally pollute only as a by-product of another primary line
of business, such as manufacturing. Thus, a holder of a waste handling permit may have more of an incentive to shirk environmental
requirements since any economic benefits of doing so will more directly affect the permittee's bottom line." These factors may explain
9.
Only two bad actor laws reviewed for purposes of this Note apply to applicants seeking
other types of environmental permits. Delaware's bad actor law applies to applicants for water,
air, and coastal zone permits. 7 Del. Code Ann. § 7902 (Supp. 1994). South Dakota's law
applies to all environmental protection permits, as well as mining, oil, and gas permits. S.D.
Cod. Laws § 1-40-27 (Supp. 1994).
10.
Strock and Runkel, 15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 557 (cited in note 7).
11. Telephone interview with Edward Galbraith, Missouri Department of Natural
Resources (Oct. 5, 1994).
At least two states, Delaware and South Dakota, have bad actor laws which apply to all
permit applicants. See note 9.
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why the bulk of bad actor laws promulgated to date have been directed at the permitting of facilities that treat or handle solid or hazardous wastes.
A New Jersey'sA-901 Law-A Prototypefor Bad Actor Laws
The state of New Jersey passed one of the nation's earliest and
most comprehensive '%ad actor" statutes in 1983.12 Sections 13:1E126 to -135 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 13 commonly referred to as the "A-901" law, were originally passed in response to
overwhelming evidence of organized crime infiltration into New
Jersey's hazardous waste industry. 14 New Jersey's bad actor law
states that its purpose is to ensure public confidence in the integrity
of the state's waste industry. 15 More specifically, the law explains
that its mission is to prevent entry into the solid or hazardous waste
industry of "persons who have pursued economic gains in an occupational manner or context violative of the criminal code or civil public
''
policies of the State. 16

To this end, New Jersey's bad actor statute requires applicants
for solid or hazardous waste disposal permits to submit disclosure
statements containing information on many of the entities associated
with the proposed waste treatment site.17 Once the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") has obtained the
information, the A-901 law prohibits the Department from issuing a
12.

Strock and Runkel, 15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 541 (cited in note 7).

13.

N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 13:1E-126 to -135 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).

14.

Strock and Runkel, 15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 542 (cited in note 7).

15. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-126 (West 1991). This section notes that the state can hope to
attain its goal of gaining public trust in the waste industry
only under a system of control and regulation that precludes the participation therein of
persons with known criminal records, habits, or associations, and excludes or removes
from any position of authority or responsibility any person known to be so deficient in
reliability, expertise, or competence with specific reference to the solid or hazardous
waste industries that his participation would create or enhance the dangers of unsound,
unfair, or illegal practices, methods, and activities in the conduct of the business of these
industries.
Id.
16. Id. This section clearly refers to organized crime.
17. The disclosure statement must include information on the following entities: (1)
officers, directors, and partners of the applicant company; (2) "key employees"--defined as any
"individual employed by the applicant, the permittee or the licensee in a supervisory capacity or
empowered to make discretionary decisions" as to facility operations, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:lE127(f) (West Supp. 1994); (3) all persons who hold equity in or debt liability of the company,
subject to some limitations; and (4) any company involved in the solid or hazardous waste
industry in which the applicant holds an equity interest. Id. § 13:1E-127(e)(1).
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permit if any person listed on the disclosure statement or any person
with a "beneficial interest" in the applicant's business has been convicted of a crime on a list ranging from murder to extortion to possession of illegal substances.'8 Among the crimes which will result in
permit denial are violations of any federal or state environmental
protection laws. 19
New Jersey's bad actor law obviously is directed toward ferreting out organized crime's presence in the state's solid and
hazardous waste industries. As discussed above, the legislature's
statement of purpose in the act makes clear that the A-901 law targets entities engaged in the waste treatment industry for purposes
which contravene public policy. Furthermore, the act's focus on a
wide range of criminal activity in permitting decisions shows that the
New Jersey legislature's concerns went beyond identifying only those
applicants who have a poor record of compliance with environmental
laws. Finally, the act requires the NJDEP to deny permits to
applicants who may themselves be innocent of any of the crimes listed
in section 13:1E-133(b) if any person required to be listed in the
disclosure statement or shown to have a "beneficial interest" in the
applicant's business has committed an offense listed in the act. This
focus on the professional affiliations of the applicant is commensurate
with a goal of preventing those involved in organized crime from
obtaining permits to operate waste treatment facilities.
Investigations and prosecutions made under New Jersey's A901 law have not only confirmed that organized crime had infiltrated
the industry, but also have confirmed that solid and hazardous waste
companies with poor environmental compliance records consistently
violate hazardous waste laws to increase their profits. 20 By disqualifying permit applicants with histories of environmental violations and
criminal convictions, New Jersey's bad actor statute has allowed the
state to make great strides toward ridding its waste industry of a
2
criminal presence. '
Focusing on New Jersey's bad actor law as the prototypical bad
actor law is, however, somewhat problematic. Certainly, New Jersey
was one of the first states to adopt what is now known as a bad actor
18. Id. § 13:1E-133. Even though individuals "having a beneficial interest in the business
of the applicant" are not required to be listed on the disclosure statement under section 13:1E127, an applicant can still be denied a permit based on such an individual's criminal convictions.
A 'person having a beneficial interest" is not defined anywhere within New Jersey's bad actor
statute.
19. Id. § 13:lE-133(b)(19).
20. Strock and Runkel, 15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 554-55 (cited in note 7).
21. Id. at 553-55.
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law, and many states have looked to the New Jersey statute as a
model in drafting their own bad actor laws. However, as noted in the
Introduction, New Jersey's law is clearly something more than a
regular bad actor statute.
New Jersey's law is, in fact, a
comprehensive, considered approach to attacking a longstanding
problem unique to the state: infiltration of organized crime into the
waste disposal and treatment industry. Nonetheless, many states,
despite the absence of an identifiable organized crime problem in
their own waste industry, have followed New Jersey's broad approach
in drafting their bad actor laws. At least sixteen of the twenty-one
state laws surveyed for this Note authorize state officials to deny
environmental operating permits based on criminal convictions
entirely unrelated to either waste disposal or the environment.22 Why
should a state environmental agency be concerned with a permit
applicant's conviction for alteration of motor vehicle identification
numbers 23 or unlawful possession of explosives24-crimes specifically
listed in some bad actor laws as mandating denial of a permit to
operate a waste disposal or treatment facility? In the case of New
Jersey's bad actor law, the answer to that question is obvious: state
officials were attacking the historical problem of organized crime
involvement in the waste disposal business.25 It could be that other

22. See Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 391-3-4.02(6)-(10) (1993); Ind. Code Ann. § 13-7-10.24(a)(3) & (4) (Bums 1990); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-3407(d) (1992); Ky. Rev. Ann. Stat. § 224.40330(c) (1991); Miss. Code Ann. § 17-17-505(1)(c) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1994); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
260.205(16) (Vernon Supp. 1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133(b) (West Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 74-4-4.2(D)(3) (1993); N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law § 27-0913(3)(d) (McKinney 1984); N.D.
Cent. Code § 23-29-04(14) (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(3) (Baldwin 1995); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(2) (Supp. 1994); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-96-30003)(4) (Law. Co-op Supp.
1993); S.D. Cod. Laws § 1-40-27(l)(b) (Supp. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-212-218 (1992); Va.
Code § 10.1-1409(8) (1993).
Pennsylvania does not explicitly allow permit denials for criminal convictions, but allows
permit denial based on a standard which could include criminal convictions. 35 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 6018.503(c) (Purdon 1993) (allowing the department to deny a permit if it "finds that the
applicant, permittee or licensee has shown a lack of ability or intention to comply with any
provision of this act"). Minnesota's bad actor law allows the agency to consider "any criminal
convictions of the permit applicant ...that bear on the likelihood that the permit applicant will
operate the facility in conformance with the requirements of [state environmental protection
laws] ....
" Minn. Stat. Ann. § 115.076, subd. 1(4) (West Supp. 1995).
23. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133(b)(13) (West Supp. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3734.44(B)(13) (Baldwin 1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(2)(m) (Supp. 1994).
24. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133(b)(15) (West Supp. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3734.44(B)(15) (Baldwin 1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(2)(o) (Supp. 1994).
25. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-126 (West 1991). See also Trade Waste Management
Association, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 230, 238, 239 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing New Jersey's
compelling state interest in keeping the waste disposal business free from the influence of
organized crime).
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states, impressed with New Jersey's success in "cleaning up" the
hazardous waste industry in its own backyard, decided that bad actor
statutes were a good idea and simply copied New Jersey's provision
rather than draft laws more appropriate for their own problems.26 Or
perhaps state legislatures actually believe that convictions for crimes
unrelated to the environment are a good indicator that a permit
applicant is more likely to ignore environmental requirements. This
Note, however, argues that the broad nexus between criminal
convictions and permit qualifications exhibited in many bad actor
statutes may also be a response to states' desires to: (1) restrict the
flow of out-of-state trash into their states; and (2) inject more
flexibility into the permitting process in order to address citizens'
concerns about the siting of waste facilities in their communities.
This Note suggests that bad actor statutes designed to further such
policies may exhibit constitutional and policy problems.
B. Bad Actor Laws Across the Country
Since the passage of New Jersey's bad actor law, numerous
other states have enacted similar laws.27 Each of these laws is dis-

tinct, but all allow state departments of environmental protection to
deny operating permits to applicants based on a history of environmental or criminal violations. 28 However, unlike New Jersey's law,
26. Interviews with various state officials familiar with the bad actor laws in their states
revealed that many states borrowed from other existing bad actor statutes in fashioning their
own. Roy Furrh, a senior attorney with the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality
explained that Mississippi relied heavily on New Jersey's law in drafting its own. Telephone
interview with Roy Furrh, Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (Oct. 5, 1994).
Edward Galbraith, an environmental specialist in the permits section of the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources, noted that bad actor laws were the "hot thing" three to four
years ago and that "every state legislature was adopting them." Telephone interview with
Edward Galbraith (cited in note 11). Theresa Gearing, manager of compliance and enforcement
for the Solid Waste Division of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation,
noted that Ohio's law is often called the '"mother statute" because "everyone came after and
copied it." Telephone interview with Theresa Gearing, Tennessee Department of Environment
and Conservation (Oct. 5, 1994). Ohio's bad actor law is practically identical to New Jersey's
law in many respects. See notes 23-24.
27. See note 3.
28. States rely on these laws to deny permits, as evidenced by the claims of unsuccessful
permit applicants in New Jersey, Indiana, and Kentucky who challenged the constitutionality of
the bad actor laws in their respective states. See Part III.L. See also note 94.
Conversations with various state environmental officials further confirm that bad actor laws
are a viable part of the permitting process in many states. In Ohio, denials are "rare," but do
occur from time to time. Telephone interview with Mark Navarre, legal section of Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency (Oct. 12, 1994). Ohio's bad actor law is implemented by an
Environmental Crimes Background Unit, which prepares a report for each permit applicant.
The report details the applicant's environmental compliance history and also describes the
status of the applicant with respect to the potentially disqualifying factors (for example, crimi-
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few other bad actor laws contain language indicating what goals the
state wishes to achieve by preventing "bad actors" from entering the
waste industry. Most states that require applicants to disclose prior
histories of criminal or environmental violations simply lump these
disclosure requirements in with other general and technical permitting requirements. 29 Among the few states that affirmatively state
30
the goals of their bad actor provisions are Delaware and Oklahoma.
The purpose sections of these two laws show that bad actor laws,
while similar in structure, can be adopted for very different purposes.
On the one hand, Delaware's law aims to "identify applicants with
histories of environmental violations, or criminal activities and/or
associations,"'31 which suggests that its goals are in line with New
Jersey's bad actor law. On the other hand, Oklahoma's law exists to
"protect the public health and safety and the environment of this
state," which suggests that its purpose is to focus only on
32
environmental violations.
Focusing on the Delaware and Oklahoma laws provides a useful perspective for understanding the two major varieties of bad actor
laws. Delaware's law represents the broad-based statutes-those
laws that focus on a broad array of criminal behavior in determining
whether a permit applicant will be disqualified from operating in the
state. However, one must use caution in considering Delaware's law
as truly representative of this category of statutes, since Delaware's

nal convictions) listed in the bad actor law. This report then goes to the Director of the Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency, who makes a final decision whether to issue the permit. Id.
Edward Galbraith of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources noted that Missouri
follows pre-set procedures to enforce the state's "habitual violator" law for hazardous waste
permit applicants, and while the state has never denied a permit based solely on an applicant's
habitual violations, at least one applicant would have been denied, but withdrew the application
for "business reasons." Telephone interview with Edward Galbraith (cited in note 11).
Roy Furrh, senior attorney with the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, explained that while the state had never denied a permit based on its bad actor law, the procedures followed by Mississippi under the law had discouraged more than one applicant with a
poor compliance record from submitting a permit application. Telephone interview with Roy
Furrh (cited in note 26).
29. See, for example, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-3407 (1992); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 299.518
(West Supp. 1994); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 260.205, 260.395 (Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 74-4-4.2 (1993); N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law § 27-0913 (McKinney 1984); N.D. Cent. Code §
23-29-04 (Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-211-106 (1992); Va. Code §§ 10.1-1408.1 to -1409
(1993).
30. 7 Del. Code Ann. § 7901 (Supp. 1994); 27A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-109(A) (West Supp.
1995).
31. 7 Del. Code Ann. § 7901(b).
32. 27A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-109(A). See the discussion of Oklahoma's purpose section
in Part IV.
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law specifically states that one of its purposes is to address organized
crime; no other broad-based statute affirmatively states a similar
purpose. Oklahoma's law, on the other hand, represents the minority
of bad actor laws-those that narrowly focus only on environmental
33
violations in the permit approval process.
Almost all bad actor laws require permit applicants to submit
a disclosure statement or certification as a mandatory part of the
permit approval process. 34 State bad actor laws vary widely, however,
in terms of what state agencies must do once they have received the
disclosure. Most laws leave full discretion to deny or approve the
permit with state environmental officials. Others, such as the New
Jersey, Ohio, and Rhode Island laws, require denial of a permit if the
applicant, any person listed on the disclosure statement, or any person shown to have a beneficial interest in the applicant's business has
been convicted of any one of a long list of crimes. 35 Ironically, South
Carolina, the only state that does not require a disclosure statement
33. It should be noted that Delaware's law is not necessarily the most comprehensive or
the broadest in scope of the broad-based bad actor laws. The Ohio and Rhode Island bad actor
laws, for example, contain a long list of potentially disqualifying crimes that mirrors the list in
New Jersey's law. The crimes include, inter alia, murder; kidnapping, gambling;, robbery;
bribery; extortion; criminal usury; arson; burglary; theft; forgery and fraudulent practices; fraud
in the offering, purchase or sale of securities; alteration of motor vehicle identification; unlawful
manufacture, purchase, use, or transfer of firearms; unlawful possession or use of destructive
devices or explosives; racketeering;, perjury or false swearing;, purposeful, knowing, willful, or
reckless violation of federal or state environmental protection laws; and felony assault. See N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133b (West Supp. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(B) (Baldwin 1995);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(2) (Supp. 1994). Also, no other law provides for an investigation
process as comprehensive as the New Jersey law, which requires applicants to be fingerprinted,
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-128(2), and allows the state attorney general to issue investigative
interrogatories and subpoenas in furtherance of an investigation of an applicant, id. §§ 13:1E129 to -130.
Similarly, Oklahoma's law is not the narrowest in scope of the narrow bad actor laws.
Tennessee's bad actor provisions relating to hazardous waste facilities, for example, mandate
permit denial only if the applicant or other specified individuals associated with the applicant
have convictions specifically relating to the unlawful treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-212-218 (1992). Tennessee's bad actor provision applying to
solid waste facilities looks to an applicant's "past performance in this or related waste management fields." Id. § 68-211-106(h). According to Theresa Gearing of the Tennessee Department
of Environment and Conservation, state officials are not sure what "related waste management
fields" includes, and have petitioned the state attorney general for an opinion resolving this
issue. Telephone interview with Theresa Gearing (cited in note 26). Missouri's bad actor law
for hazardous waste facilities mandates permit denial for "habitual" violators of the state's solid
or hazardous waste laws. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 260.395(16) (Vernon 1990).
34. Only one state, South Carolina, leaves the decision to require disclosure up to state
environmental officials. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-96-300(A) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993).
35. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133b (West Supp. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(B)
(Baldwin 1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(2) (Supp. 1994). For examples of offenses
mandating permit denial, see note 33. Each of these laws, however, does provide an opportunity
for the applicant to prove rehabilitation. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133.1 (West Supp. 1994); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3744.44(C)(9) (Baldwin 1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(3) (Supp. 1994).
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as a mandatory part of the permit approval process, does require the
state to deny permits to applicants who submit disclosures showing,
inter alia, a continuing history of criminal convictions or environmental violations36 Finally, while Missouri's bad actor law for solid
waste permit applicants does not require the state to deny permits in
specific instances, it does require the state to consider the report in
37
the permit approval process.
The level of discretion provided by most state bad actor statutes is troubling because it allows state officials to apply the laws in a
non-uniform manner. Furthermore, allowing state agencies the discretion38 to make the ultimate decision as to whether a permit application should be approved under the bad actor law leaves room for the
agencies to pursue questionable goals in the name of environmental
protection3 9

36. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-96-300(B)(4) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993).
37. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 260.205(16) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
38. Under federal law, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") limits agency discretion
through judicial review. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). Under section 706 of the APA, a reviewing
court can overturn agency actions that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. § 706(A). Most states have their own administrative
procedure laws which function like the APA. However, judicial review under an "arbitrary,
capricious" standard does not necessarily address the problem of states pursuing questionable
goals via bad actor laws. As long as a state agency complies with the terms of the bad actor
statute in denying a permit (for example, by denying a permit to an applicant with the requisite
number of violations or an applicant who fails to show the required level of "good character"),
the challenged agency action will likely survive judicial review. Butjudicial review of individual
agency actions under a bad actor statute cannot address the fact that the statute may be designed to allow the state to deny permits for more suspect reasons simply by proving that the
applicant fits the statutory definition of "bad actor."
39. An examination of bad actor laws would be incomplete without considering federal
efforts to identify parties presumed to pose a threat to environmental protection. Federal
lawmakers twice have sponsored a law similar to state bad actor laws. In 1990 and again in
1991, Representatives William Paxson of New York and Mike Synar of Oklahoma introduced a
bill in the House of Representatives to disqualify "any individual or business concern who
violates a federal environmental law, or who holds a beneficial business interest in a person who
has violated such a law" from receiving "benefits" from the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") for a ten-year period. H.R. 4433, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 29, 1990); H.R. 3271, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 2, 1991). The Paxson/Synar bill did not make it out of committee either
time it was introduced in the House.
The Paxson bill is not the only provision focusing on the "character" of federal permit
applicants that has received attention at the federal level. In 1989, Representative Thomas
Luken of Ohio introduced the Waste Export Control Act ('"ECA"). H.R. 3736, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (Nov. 19, 1989). WECA contained provisions establishing a permit program for waste
exporters that would require permit applicants to disclose information on their officers,
directors, partners, and key employees, as well as "any other information EPA 'may require that
relates to the competency, reliability, or good character of the applicant."' Thomas R.
Mounteer, Codifing Basel Convention Obligations Into U.S. Law: The Waste Export Control
Act, 21 Envir. L. Rep. (Envir. L. Inst.) 10085, 10091 (1991). H.R. 3736 did not pass the 101st
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III. CONCERNS RAISED BY BROAD-BASED BAD ACTOR LAWS

If it is true that many state bad actor laws are modeled after
the New Jersey prototype, yet do not purport to address the same
organized crime concerns as the New Jersey law, the breadth of these
subsequent laws may raise both constitutional and policy problems.
The following Part discusses potential constitutional infirmities of
these laws by analyzing facial constitutional claims that have already
been brought against existing broad-based bad actor laws and by suggesting other constitutional problems not yet raised in the cases. This
Part also points out several policy concerns raised by these laws.
A. ConstitutionalConcerns
1. Facial Challenges to Bad Actor Laws
To date, at least three bad actor statutes have been challenged
on a constitutional basis. Each of these cases involved a facial chal40
lenge to the constitutionality of the particular bad actor statute.
These decisions addressing the constitutionality of bad actor statutes
provide direction for states that have not yet enacted their own bad

Congress, but is expected to be reintroduced as part of the reauthorization of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). Id. at 10085.
Currently, there are several federal provisions aimed at preventing bad actors who already
have permits from continuing to violate environmental laws. Under the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act, companies convicted of specified environmental violations are automatically
"listed," or banned from contracting with the government until the situation that led to the
conviction is remedied to the satisfaction of the EPA Administrator. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988)
(Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (Clean Air Act); 40 C.F.R. §§ 15.10-.41
(1994) (implementing regulations). The federal government may also suspend and, eventually,
bar companies convicted of criminal conduct under any of the major federal environmental
statutes from contracting with the federal government. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 32.100-.635 (1994); 48
C.F.R. §§ 9.400-.409 (1994).
The only existing federal laws that require permit applicants to inform the EPA of any past
or current noncompliance with federal environmental laws before they can receive a permit are
regulations providing for the disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"). Strock and Runkel,
15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 532-33 (cited in note 7). The PCB regulations are the closest in form
and function to the state bad actor statutes. These regulations require applicants for PCB storage permits to disclose information relevant to their qualifications to engage in commercial
storage of such waste, including any information on past violations of state or federal environmental laws involving waste handling. 40 C.F.R. § 761.65(d)(3) (1994). Furthermore, the
regulations allow the EPA Administrator to approve or disapprove a permit application based in
part on an assessment of the applicant's prior compliance history. 40 C.F.R. § 761.65(d)(2)(vii)
(1994). Notice that the PCB regulation is a good example of a narrowly-drawn bad actor law, as
it focuses solely on environmental violations in the permit approval process.
40. The Author is not aware of any as-applied constitutional challenges to a state bad
actor law.
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actor statutes or are in the process of amending current statutes, 4 1
and for future courts hearing challenges to other states' bad actor
laws.
The following discussion focuses on a Third Circuit opinion
upholding New Jersey's bad actor law, as well as state court opinions
from both Indiana and Kentucky. The implications of each of these
cases for existing and proposed bad actor laws are examined as well.
a. Trade Waste Management Association, Inc. v. Hughey
In 1985, a trade association and several solid waste disposal
companies brought an action challenging New Jersey's A-901 law as
violative of the United States Constitution.
In Trade Waste
42
Management Association, Inc. v. Hughey, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a district court decision that had struck down New
Jersey's bad actor law on freedom of association and freedom of privacy grounds. 43 The Third Circuit's decision to uphold New Jersey's
bad actor law was limited, however, to a finding that the statute was
valid on its face.

44

i. The Freedom of Association Claim
The plaintiffs' central claim was that the disqualification criteria in the New Jersey bad actor statute violated their constitutional
right of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth amendments.45 The plaintiffs alleged that the disqualifying criteria violated
this right by providing for denial of their permit application if they
associated with certain individuals who had been convicted of or
charged with certain listed offenses or who lacked a reputation for
46
good character, honesty, and integrity.
The court acknowledged that the constitutional right of association involves two distinct elements: (1) recognition of individual

41. These decisions may also be a source of guidance for federal legislators who wish to
support efforts to pass a bad actor statute applying to federal environmental benefits. See note
39 (dealing with relevant federal law).
42. 780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985).
43. Id. at 222-23.
44. Id. at 229-30, 239-40. The court was not able to determine whether New Jersey's bad
actor statute might be invalid as applied because the plaintiffs had not yet been subject to a
permit review under the statute.
45. Id. at 236.
46. Id.
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autonomy to engage in intimate human relationships, namely family
relationships; and (2) recognition of the right to engage in collective
47
action with others to advance social, economic, and other interests.
The court held that New Jersey's law did not interfere with the types
of intimate associations that the Supreme Court has held the First
Amendment protects. 48 The court then addressed the second prong of
associational freedoms, explaining that while maximum protection
was provided for associations formed for expressive purposes, associations formed for the pursuit of private economic interests-such as
waste disposal companies-were only eligible for a lesser degree of
49
First Amendment protection.
The court wavered as to the level of scrutiny to be applied to a
state intrusion on commercial group associational rights, but eventually determined that a high level of scrutiny was appropriate. 0 The
Third Circuit, however, found that New Jersey's A-901 provisions
survived both prongs of the strict scrutiny analysis. First, the court
held that the state had a "compelling" interest in "keeping the sensitive waste disposal business free from the influence of organized
crime," especially "considering New Jersey's history of difficulties in
the waste disposal business."'51 Second, the court found that the
52
state's interest could not be achieved through less intrusive means.
ii. The Right to Privacy Claim
The plaintiffs' right to privacy claim in Trade Waste
Management was directed at provisions of New Jersey's bad actor law
that required fingerprinting of applicants, authorized the state attorney general to obtain criminal justice information from the FBI, and
provided for the use of disclosure statements in investigations of
permit applicants. 53 In analyzing the plaintiffs' privacy claim, the
court explained that unspecified provisions of the federal Constitution
protect privacy with respect to two interests: (1) the "interest in
independence [from governmental intrusion] in making certain kinds
of important decisions" (such as those related to marriage and

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984)).
Id. at 237 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20).
Id. at 238 (citing NAACP v. ClaiborneHardwareCo., 458 U.S. 886, 912 (1982)).
Id.
Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 233.
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procreation); and (2) the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. ' '
The court acknowledged that while the first of these interests
was not implicated by New Jersey's bad actor law, the latter interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters was. 55 However, the court
found that none of the provisions challenged by the plaintiffs violated
their right to privacy, as the criminal records and pending criminal
charges required to be disclosed were public in nature, and the law's
fingerprinting requirement was rationally related to the investigation
process.6 The court also noted that even if the required disclosures
were deemed to be of a private rather than public nature, New
Jersey's strong interest in the qualifications of persons involved in
57
waste handling would overcome the plaintiffs' privacy interest.
While the Third Circuit upheld New Jersey's bad actor law
against various constitutional challenges in Trade Waste
Management, its decision should not be viewed as a conclusive holding
on the constitutionality of broad-based bad actor statutes in general.
Trade Waste Management may be limited in applicability due to the
fact that the Third Circuit's decision was based in part on New
Jersey's compelling interest in keeping the waste disposal industry
free from the influence of organized crime, particularly given the
state's history in this area. Thus, a state law similar in scope to New
Jersey's may be unable to withstand constitutional challenges on
either of the grounds stated in Trade Waste Management if the state
cannot present evidence of organized crime infiltration of the state's
waste industry to serve as a compelling interest behind the adoption
of its law.
b. Indiana Department of Environmental Management v.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
In December 1994, the Indiana Supreme Court found that facial challenges to Indiana's so-called good character law 58 were not
ripe for review since the state agency had not yet begun considering
the plaintiff's application to modify its existing hazardous waste
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
terms its

Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-10.2-1 to -8(Burns 1990 & Supp. 1994). Indiana optimistically
bad actor law a "good character law."
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treatment and storage facility in Fort Wayne, Indiana. 9 The court's
opinion in Indiana Department of Environmental Management v.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. renders moot a June 1993 opinion
in which the Marion County Superior Court had held Indiana's good
60
character law unconstitutional, both as applied and on its face.
Although the Indiana Supreme Court failed to reach the merits of
Chemical Waste Management's constitutional claims, the court did
comment on each of the claims "solely to provide clarification as the
Commissioner attempts to apply the statute."61 The dicta in Chemical
Waste Management suggests that the court would uphold the statute
against the constitutional claims already advanced by Chemical
Waste Management in the event the company brought another action
62
when ripe for judicial review.
It is difficult to predict the value the Indiana Supreme Court
decision will have to courts, legislators, and state agency officials who
look to this opinion for guidance in examining the constitutionality of
other bad actor statutes. Since the opinion does not provide a holding
on the merits of Chemical Waste Management's constitutional claims,
however, it cannot be considered an authoritative stance by the
Indiana state judiciary on the constitutional legitimacy of the state's
good character law.
c. Attwoods of North America, Inc. v. Kentucky Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet
In January 1995, the Franklin Circuit Court of Kentucky
handed down a judgment in response to Attwoods of North America's
motion for partial summary judgment based on Attwoods' claim that
59. Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Chemical Waste Management,
Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336-37 (Ind.1994).
60. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Environmental
Management, No. 49DO29201-CP-0009, slip op. at 75 ([Ind.], Marion County Superior Ct., June
23, 1993). In a voluminous opinion containing extensive findings of fact based on testimony
given by the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM") regarding its intended application of the law, the superior court upheld each of Chemical Waste Managements

eight constitutional challenges to Indiana's good character law. The court held that the law: (1)
is impermissibly vague and standardlkss; (2) fails to provide procedural due process before the
agency issues a negative "good character" determination; (3) exceeds the state's police power, (4)
is being implemented by the agency without adherence to proper rule-making procedures; (5)
violates due process by allowing the agency to attach new penalties to long-settled alleged

violations; (6) violates the right of association; (7) is an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority; and (8) denies equal protection of the law (by exempting non-commercial permit
applicants from the requirements of the good character statute). Id. at 6, 37.
61. Chemical Waste Management, 643 N.E.2d at 337.
62. See id. at 337-42. The court noted that it did not intend to interfere unnecessarily in
the state's "essential efforts" with regard to its bad actor law. Id. at 342.
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Kentucky's bad actor law63 was constitutionally invalid.6 Attwoods'
constitutional claims were based on Kentucky Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet's ("the Cabinet") decision to deny a
permit to Bituminous Resources, Inc. under Kentucky's bad actor
statute. 65 Attwoods challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky's bad
actor statute on the grounds that it exceeds the state's police powers,
is impermissibly vague, and deprives permit applicants of procedural
due process. 66 The court upheld the statute against each of these
challenges.67
i. Police Power Claim
Attwoods claimed that Kentucky's bad actor law exceeds the
state's police powers in violation of Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution.68 Specifically, Attwoods challenged the law on the
ground that it allows the Cabinet to consider both felonies unrelated
to environmental crimes and outstanding notices of violations in the
permit approval process. 69 However, the court held that Kentucky
had acted in conformance with its police powers in requiring this type
of information from permit applicants.o
The court found that the Cabinet could properly consider nonenvironmental felony convictions since the failure to follow criminal
laws has a bearing on the fitness of an applicant and may have an

63. Ky. Rev. Ann. Stat. § 224.40-330 (1991).
64. Attwoods of North America, Inc. v. Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental
ProtectionCabinet,No. 93-CI-01873, slip op. ([Ky.], Franklin County Circuit Ct., Jan. 13, 1995).
65. Id. at 2-4. Attwoods Environmental Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Attwoods of
North America, Inc., owned 49% of the common stock of Bituminous Resources, Inc. at the time
that Biruminous Resources, Inc. filed its permit application to operate and construct a solid
waste landfill in Hopkins County, Kentucky. Id. at 1.
66. Id. at 4. Attwoods also challenged the Cabinet's actions under the statute as
exceeding their statutory authority. Id. at 3-4. These claims are not examined here, as they are
not of a constitutional nature.
67. Id. at 23-24.
68. Id. Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution reads: "Absolute and arbitrary power over
the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority." Ky Const., § 2.
69. Attwoods, slip op. at 8-10. Attwoods also claimed that the law exceeded the state's
police powers by requiring permit applicants to disclose information on managers of affiliated
corporations and by using the wrongdoings of such managers as grounds for a permit denial. Id.
at 8. However, the court read the statute to exclude managers of affiliated corporations from
the "key personnel" for which disclosures must be made and thus found Attwoods police power
claim moot on this point. Id.
70. Id. at 10.
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impact on the applicant's ability to follow Kentucky's laws.71 With
respect to outstanding notices of violations, the court read Kentucky's
bad actor law as prohibiting the Cabinet from issuing a permit until
the complaint was resolved, rather than allowing the Cabinet to base
a permit denial on such unproven allegations.72 The court determined
that this delay was appropriate since an ultimate finding of
wrongdoing would affect the Cabinet's final decision to approve or
3
deny the permit7
ii. Vagueness Claim
Attwoods next claimed that Kentucky's bad actor law violates
Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution 74 and substantive due process 75
by giving the Cabinet discretion in deciding which permits to approve
and deny.7 6 However, the court found that the discretion provided to
the Cabinet under the bad actor law violated neither the Kentucky
Constitution nor principles of substantive due process since the
legislature defined the "policy and principles" for when a permit may
be denied 77 and the Cabinet's actions are subject to judicial review for
78
abuse of discretion.
iii. Procedural Due Process Claim
Finally, Attwoods challenged the bad actor law on procedural
due process grounds under both the United States Constitution and
Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution.7 9 However, the court refused
to recognize Attwoods's alleged loss of goodwill and damage to its
liberty and reputational interests as protected under either the state
80
or federal constitution.

71. Id. at9.
72. Id. at 10.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 11.
75. The court is presumably referring to the protections provided to individuals under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, even though the court refers to the Fourth
and Fifth amendments. Id.
76. Id. at 10-13.
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 13-17. Ssection 14 of the Kentucky Constitution states, "All courts shall be
open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or
delay." Ky Const., § 14.
80. Attwoods, slip op. at 14-17.
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It is difficult to predict the value of the Attwoods opinion for
future cases, given that it is an unpublished state court opinion and
relies heavily upon a construction of the Kentucky Constitution.
However, when viewed in conjunction with the opinion of the Indiana
Supreme Court in Chemical Waste Management, the court's decision
in this case may reflect state court reluctance to overturn bad actor
laws on constitutional grounds.
2. A Proposed As-Applied Challenge to Some Bad Actor Laws
Neither the Third Circuit nor the two state supreme court
cases discussed above involved as-applied challenges to bad actor
laws. 8 ' As-applied challenges claim that laws fail constitutional
muster not as written, but as they are applied to certain entities on a
case-by-case basis. The following section suggests that while some
broad-based bad actor laws appear to have survived facial
constitutional scrutiny, these same laws may raise constitutional
concerns if they are applied in prohibited ways.
As suggested earlier, the prevalence of broad-based bad actor
laws raises the question of what motives guided state legislatures in
adopting these laws. As the evidence below reveals, one goal that
may have prompted states to adopt broadly drawn bad actor laws is a
desire to foster economic protectionism for their own waste handling
industry by keeping out-of-state waste haulers from importing trash
into their states and preventing out-of-state operators from setting up
shop within their borders. While it is difficult, and some would say
impossible, 2 to determine what motivates a body of lawmakers to
adopt a particular law, the following evidence suggests that protectionist concerns may be a primary policy underlying some state bad
actor laws.

81. The plaintiffs in the Attwoods case, however, did raise a statutory as-applied challenge
to Kentucky's bad actor law, claiming that the state agency exceeded its statutory authority in
the manner that it applied the law's provisions to Bituminous Resources, Inc.'s permit
application. See id. at 17-23.
82. For a discussion of public choice theory and procedural obstacles to majoritarian preferences in the legislature, see generally William M. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Cases
and Materialson Legislation, Statutes and the Creation ofPublicPolicy 368-77 (West, 1988).
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a. Evidence of ProtectionistMotives
The logical starting point of an inquiry into the motives behind broad-based bad actor laws is to assume that these laws, like the
New Jersey law after which they are modeled, are aimed at eliminating the presence of organized crime from the solid and hazardous
waste industry.83 However, it may be that some states merely tout

the goal of fighting or controlling organized crime as a pretext for a
more constitutionally suspect goal-protectionism.8 Media accounts
of legislative and public debate concerning waste disposal and badactor statutes reveal that while states seek to avoid the influence of
organized crime, there may be other, more troubling agendas behind
state bad actor laws. These accounts, drawn for purposes of this Note
from the Midwest, suggest a growing concern over the relationship
between organized crime and hazardous waste. Not one account,
83. With few exceptions, however, nothing in the statutes themselves indicates that states
are pursuing the eradication of organized crime in the hazardous waste industry by the adoption of bad actor statutes. But see 7 Del. Code Ann. § 7901(b) (Supp. 1994) (referring possibly to
organized crime in identifying applicants with "criminal activities and/or associations"); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(6) (Supp. 1994) (prohibiting specifically the issuance of permits to an
applicant if any person with a beneficial interest in the applicant's business has "pursued economic gain in an occupational manner or context which is in violation of the criminal or civil
public policies of [the] state"). See also Douglas Meiklejohn, The New Mexico Solid Waste Act: A
Beginning for Control of Municipal Solid Waste in the Land of Enchantment, 21 N.M. L. Rev.
167, 177 (1990) (suggesting that New Mexico's disclosure law was adopted at least partially in
response to the threat of organized crime).
Conversations with state environmental administrators reveal that concern over organized
crime was clearly part of the reason that some states adopted bad actor laws, though one may
wonder whether that concern is warranted. One Ohio environmental official noted that the
main concern behind Ohio's bad actor legislation was fear of "east coast organized criminals
getting involved in Ohio landfills." Telephone interview with Mark Navarre (cited in note 28).
When asked whether Ohio ever actually had problems with mob infiltration of its waste industry, Navarre explained that around the time Ohio's bad actor law was passed, there was one
"bad guy" in particular who operatea in the east side of the state around whom public concern
was centered. Id. It is interesting to note that parts of the Ohio statute were drawn almost
verbatim from the New Jersey statute, which is also concerned primarily with organized crime.
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(A) & (B) (Baldwin 1995).
Ray Furrh of the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality noted that problems in
the Northeast and concerns about a "big criminal element" in the waste industry prompted
Mississippi to adopt a bad actor law, but explained, "we don't seem to fird the same problems
[here]." Telephone interview with Ray Furrh (cited in note 28). Similarly, Theresa Gearing of
the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation pointed to "some problems up
north," and referred to the Trade Waste Management case when asked about influences for
Tennessee's bad actor law. Telephone interview Theresa Gearing (cited in note 26).
84. This theory is the result of research conducted with the intention of proving the
Author's original theory-that states were indeed adopting bad actor laws in order to ensure
that organized criminals did not gain a foothold in their own waste industry as had happened in
New Jersey. This research consisted of a search of newspaper articles over the last five years
that discuss both organized crime and hazardous waste, with the midwestern states randomly
chosen as a geographical limitation. The search was done on LEXIS, NEWS library, MWEST
fie, using the following search request: "hazardous waste" /25 "organized crime."
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however, discusses the current presence of organized crime in the
states at issue; instead, the accounts focus heavily on concerns that
the importation of trash from northeastern states would bring
organized crime to the Midwest.
A 1989 article in the Chicago Tribune, for example, threatened:
"Gangsters and garbage often go together," and warned that "huge
profits" from disposing northeastern waste in midwestern landfills
could cause an increase in the amount of waste coming from the
Northeast and lead to mob infiltration of the waste disposal industry
in the Midwest. 85 The article quoted the chief of criminal justice of
the New Jersey Attorney General's office as encouraging midwestern
states to adopt laws requiring background investigations of entities in
the waste disposal industry as a way to prevent the mob from gaining
a foothold in their states. 86
Another article, from a 1991 edition of the Louisville,
Kentucky, Courier-Journal, spoke of connections between existing and
proposed Kentucky landfills and "individuals or companies targeted
elsewhere in probes of organized crime and its grip on the garbage
trade. 87 This article also suggested background checks as a necessary
legal barrier to infiltration of the mob into Kentucky landfills, looking
to bad actor statutes in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio as
successful examples.88 In another newspaper story in the CourierJournal, one journalist described a gubernatorial candidate's proposal
to require background checks on the waste industry, and then wrote
about "anotherway to block waste imports," implicitly suggesting that
the disclosure law would be merely one element of a broader campaign to limit the influx of out-of-state waste. 9 Once Kentucky did
adopt the suggested bad actor statute, a 1993 article in the CourierJournal described the law as "aimed at keeping the state from becoming a second home to notoriously corrupt elements of the
Northeastern garbage industry.' O
85. Casey Bukro, Crime Ties to GarbageFirms Told, Chi. Trib. B5 (Dec. 3,1989).
86. Id. Interestingly, the article also quoted Jerry Gladden, chief investigator for the
Chicago Crime Commission, saying that no particular organized crime group from the Chicago
area was known to control the waste disposal industry there. Id.
87. Michael M. Jennings, Organized Crime Extends Influence to Garbage Trade in
Kentucky, Courier-Journal 10A (Jan. 13, 1991) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. Al Cross, Jones' Platform Proposes Background Checks for Trash Companies, CourierJournal 2B (April 10, 1991) (emphasis added).
90. Fran Ellers, Legal Woes Beset Firm PlanningLandfill: British Company Disputes
Findingsin State Report, Courier-Journal 1A (Dec. 6, 1993).
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It is well documented that landfill space is rapidly decreasing
and that dumping fees are rising just as rapidly in the Northeast. 9'
As this happens, the overwhelmed northeastern states look to the
Midwest and other regions for places to dump their waste. 92 States
facing an influx of waste from the Northeast undoubtedly are looking
for some way to stop or reduce the flow. This is not to say that bad
actor statutes are merely clever devices to exclude out-of-state waste
by scrutinizing "character" during the permitting process. 93 However,
if some of these statutes seem particularly well-designed to smoke out
organized crime, and the only organized crime concerning the state is
out-of-state organized crime, it follows to ask whether the true
94
concern lies with the mob or the trash.

If the officials quoted in these stories have suggested that their states have adopted bad
actor statutes out of a fear of corrupt waste from other states, the stories also suggest that
protectionist concerns may enter into the hazardous and solid waste treatment permit approval
process through the bad actor statute. It may be that states that profess to be concerned about
accepting mob-tainted waste from the Northeast are really concerned about accepting waste
from the Northeast, period.
91. See Melinda Beck, Buried Alive, Newsweek 67 (Nov. 27, 1989) (discussing the
shrinking capacity and decreasing number of the nation's landfills, particularly in the
Northeast).
92. Id.
93. However, the nexus that many states have drawn between criminal convictions and
permit denials must have some meaning, and the fact that such convictions do not bear an
obvious connection to an applicant's reliability or competence to run a waste disposal operation
begs the question as to what the nexus really is.
94. This question of statutory motive becomes even more pertinent considering the large
flow of trash from the Northeast and the apparently high profits to be gained from moving this
waste to cheaper rural landfills in the Midwest and the South. Furthermore, the courts have
been besieged with cases concerning state attempts to prevent or dissuade out-of-staters from
dumping waste in their landfills since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Philadelphiav.
New Jersey. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Although the Court's decision in this case made clear that
measures which seemed to be protectionist in nature would be subjected to searching scrutiny,
states have continued to devise taxes, tipping fees, and other barriers directed at imported
waste. These attempts have been uniformly struck down. See, for example, Government
Suppliers ConsolidatingServ. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 766 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (invalidating an
Indiana law which imposed greater tipping fees on out-of-state waste than on in-state waste);
National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244, 265 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(striking down a state law requiring garbage transporters coming into Ohio to submit to Ohio
jurisdiction); American Trucking v. Secretary of State, 595 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Me. 1991) (ruling
that a flat fee per truck for solid waste haulers was unconstitutional, because similar actions by
every state would create a significant burden on commerce); Chemical Waste Management,Inc.
v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2017 (1992) (holding that an additional disposal fee imposed by
Alabama on hazardous waste generated outside the state was unconstitutional); Oregon Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1355 (1994)
(invalidating a surcharge on in-state disposal of out-of-state waste); C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town
of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1684 (1994) (striking down a flow control ordinance which
required all solid waste to be processed at a local transfer station before leaving the town).
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b. The ConstitutionalProblem
This Note makes no attempt to speculate whether some states
actually have used their bad actor statutes to exclude out-of-state
95
landfill operators and haulers from operating in their state.
However, it does argue that the weak nexus between disqualifying
factors and permit denial in many bad actors laws opens these laws to
misuse in the advance of protectionist concerns. And if this misuse
indeed occurs, then these laws may be constitutionally infirm.
There are two primary strains of case law in which the
Supreme Court has struck down a protectionist state law under the
so-called dormant Commerce Clause: (1) when the challenged law
facially discriminates against out-of-state interests; and (2) when the
challenged law discriminates in effect only.96 Philadelphia v. New
Jersey97 is an example of the first type of case. In Philadelphia,the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a 1973 New Jersey law that
prohibited the importation of waste that originated or was collected

95. However, conversations with state officials reveal that out-of-state trash may, in fact,
be an underlying concern behind the implementation of bad actor statutes. Roy Furrh of the
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, while explaining that Mississippi had never
denied a permit based on its bad actor statute, noted that the law "has prevented more than one
applicant from applying in our state based on their compliance record," implicitly suggesting
that Mississippi's law may act more to the detriment of out-of-state applicants than others.
Telephone interview with'Roy Furrh (cited in note 26) (emphasis added). Inquiries into the
roots of Indiana's bad actor law elicited the explanation that Indiana's law "grew out of problems with long haul trash from New Jersey, New York, and eastern Pennsylvania which was
being shipped to Indiana because it was cheaper to dispose of it here." Telephone conversation
with Pat Morrison, External Affairs Department, Indiana Department of Environmental
Management (Nov. 15, 1993). Finally, Mike Apple, Assistant Director of the Division of Solid
Waste Management in Tennessee's state environmental agency, explained that Tennessee's bad
actor law had been adopted as a very small component of the state's comprehensive solid waste
management program in order to appease political concerns about "out-of-state wastes and
unscrupulous operators." Telephone interview with Mike Apple, Assistant Director, Division of
Solid Waste Management, Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (Oct. 7,
1994). He further noted that the Department of Environment and Conservation had been given
little guidance on how to implement the statute, and that as a result, it had been difficult to
administer. Id.
96. For a discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause and protectionism, see generally
Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw 242-61 (Foundation, 12th ed. 1991). There is also a third
strain of case law which, like the second, involves facially nondiscriminatory state regulations
which nevertheless impact interstate commerce. These cases involve state laws which have
some incidental effect on commerce, but which presumably were not enacted for protectionist
purposes. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of state legislation under the
dormant Commerce Clause, see Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1401,
1411-18 (1994).
97. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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outside the state's borders.9 In striking the law down, the Court held
that it did not need to determine the ultimate legislative purpose
behind the law since the statute, both facially and in its effect, violated the dormant Commerce Clause's principle of nondiscrimination. 99 Nevertheless, the Court went on to note that the law was "an
obvious effort" to saddle out-of-staters with the burden of preserving
the dwindling capacity of New Jersey's landfills. 0 0 It does not seem
likely that any of the bad actor laws currently in existence would be
found unconstitutional under a Philadelphiav. New Jersey rationale
as none of these laws facially purports to exclude out-of-state waste.
However, it may still be possible to challenge bad actor laws as
discriminatory in their effect. For example, in Hunt v. Washington
Apple Advertising Commission,101 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a North Carolina law that required apples sold or
shipped into the state to bear only the U.S. grade or standard. The
law, while facially neutral, was found to discriminate against
Washington state, the source of nearly half of all apples shipped in
closed containers in interstate commerce. 0 2 Washington state had
developed its own grading system for apples with equivalent or higher
grades than the comparable federal standards, so North Carolina's
system imposed a higher cost on Washington apple growers who
wished to do business in the state of North Carolina. 0 3 The Court
found that North Carolina's asserted interest in eliminating deception
and confusion in the marketplace was not sufficient to justify the
law's discriminatory effect.'04 In striking the law down, the Court
relied mainly on the law's discriminatory effect, rather than seeking
to determine whether the North Carolina state legislature actually
possessed a protectionist motive when passing the statute. 0 5
The Hunt case is evidence that the Supreme Court will scrutinize a state statute for discriminatory effects even after finding the
law neutral on its face. This case may provide an adequate basis in
the law for striking down a bad actor law that, in effect, serves to
disadvantage out-of-state interests for local benefit. However, the
Hunt case may be applicable only to those state laws that have the
effect of disadvantaging out-of-state interests.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 628.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 629.
432 U.S. 333 (1977).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 353.
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Yet bad actor statutes may lend themselves to protectionist
goals in a subtly different way, by providing sufficient discretion for
officials to pursue protectionist motives. 10 6 If this is so, these laws
may be more accurately described as discriminatory as applied, rather
than discriminatory in effect. For a plaintiff to wage a successful asapplied challenge to a bad actor law, the plaintiff might have to prove
not only that the bad actor law discriminated in its effect, but also
that the state officials or the state legislature were improperly motivated or intended to discriminate to further protectionist goals.
However, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find that laws
challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause result from
improper purposes and motives on behalf of the relevant state legisla7
ture.10
B. Policy Concerns
Even if bad actor statutes stand on firm ground constitutionally, an examination of their legitimacy is not complete without scrutiny of the policy concerns they raise. Laws that are constitutional
may yet be unfair or unwise if they leave too much room for discretion
in the hands of those who implement them. Room for discretionary
behavior is room for state officials to pursue goals that may not be in
the public interest or to discriminate against certain types of entities.
Furthermore, constitutional laws may nevertheless raise serious
policy concerns if they purport to serve one goal, but are susceptible to
administrative manipulation to serve others. This section discusses
policy concerns raised by overly broad bad actor laws.
1. Protectionism
If broad-based bad actor statutes are actually adopted as a
mechanism for protecting state waste industries from outside compe106. See note 38.
107. Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw at 252-53 (cited in note 96). Gunther suggests that the
Court has been more willing to find purposeful discrimination outside of the Commerce Clause
realm. Id. A plaintiff could perhaps bring a similar purposeful discrimination challenge to a
bad actor law on equal protection grounds. In Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), the Supreme Court elaborated on what considerations go into a
finding that a legislature or administrative body was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
However, even if a plaintiff could succeed in proving such a purpose, the equal protection claim
would receive only rational basis review because bad actor statutes are business regulations.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (holding that an Oklahoma
statute regulating the field of optometry survived rational basis review).
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tition and for excluding out-of-state trash from in-state landfills, then
these protectionist laws raise policy concerns. The national economy,
and indeed, our national unity would be harmed if all states pursued
clever methods of protecting their own resources and wealth to the
disadvantage of other states. 0

8

This is particularly true in the area of

waste handling, as the entire nation has been affected by lack of
available waste disposal sites.10 9
2. The "Not in My Backyard" Syndrome
Some bad actor statutes are couched in terms so vague they
allow ample room for administrators to make permitting decisions in
less than evenhanded ways. In addition to listing various types of
prior conduct that may disqualify an applicant, some bad actor statutes link permit approval decisions to standards such as exhibition of
"sufficient reliability, expertise, and competency, ' ' O "lack of ability or

intention to comply with any provision" of the act," or "good character, honesty, and integrity."112 This looseness of standards in bad
actor laws creates a problem quite distinct from the theory postulated
in Part III.A.2.a that state officials may be systematically using bad
actor laws to stop the flow of out of state waste. Rather, vague
standards in a law prevent its systematic application and invite ad
hoc implementation or, even worse, manipulation. At least one
commentator has suggested that some states with bad actor laws are
guilty of the "not in my backyard" ("NIMBY") syndrome with regard
This
to permitting waste disposal and treatment facilities." 3
suggestion is based on a concern that community pressure to prevent
the construction of a hazardous waste facility in a certain
neighborhood, for example, might sway the permitting authority to
108. Donald H. Reagan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1112-25 (1986) (discussing three policy

objections to state protectionist legislation: (1) the "concept of union" objection, (2) the
"resentment/retaliation" objection, and (3) the "efficiency" objection).
109. See notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
110. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133(a) (West 1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(A)
(Baldwin 1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1994). See also Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 115.076, subd. 1 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring "sufficient expertise and competence").
111. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-3407(c)(3) (1992); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6018.503(c) (Purdon
1993).
112. R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(4) (1989 & Supp. 1994). See also S.D. Cod. Laws § 1-40.
27(1)(e) (1992 & Supp. 1994) (requiring only "good character and competency").
New Weapons in
113. Steven B. Drucker, Comment, Bad Actor Statutes:
Environmentalists'Arsenal,2 U. Balt. J. Envir. L. 73, 85 (1992).
One state environmental official has opined that bad actor statutes exist because "some
states just don't want landfills." Telephone interview with Theresa Gearing (cited in note 26).
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deny the contested permit, given that the standards for permitting
114 While
under the bad actor statute leave room for such discretion.
such a misuse of bad actor statutes would be hard to document, there
is at least some evidence that state permitting officials are influenced
by community concerns when performing background investigations
on permit applicants. 115
3. At the Expense of Environmental Protection
This Note suggests that broad-based bad actor statutes may be
adopted and applied to accomplish a variety of goals besides environmental protection. They may be drafted to serve as a first-line defense against organized crime. They may be applied by state officials
in such a way as to favor in-state waste handlers and exclude imported garbage. They may even be manipulated to accommodate
citizens' concerns about landfills in their neighborhoods. Yet our legal
system should not tolerate abuses of the citizenry's belief that laws
are designed to accomplish their apparent purpose, rather than to
advance other goals that, if revealed, would raise serious questions
about the laws' validity.

114. Drucker, 2 U. Bat. J. Envir. L. at 86.
115. For example, a 1993 story in the Cleveland Plain Dealer highlighting a massive investigation conducted by the Ohio Attorney General under the state's bad actor law suggests that
there was more to the investigation than a simple check into a permit applicant's qualifications.
T. C. Brown, FisherRules WTI Ownership Changes Illegal: IncineratorMust Seek New Permit,
Undergo Another Hearing,Plain Dealer 5B (July 1, 1993). The story recites details of a threeyear investigation of a proposed hazardous waste incinerator operation, which resulted in a 296page report revealing that the partnership behind the project had substituted new partners for
those in the original partnership without notifying state waste management officials. This
failure to notify officials of the ownership change was described in the voluminous report as "a
violation of hazardous waste law [that] will reflect negatively on [the permit applicant's] reliability." Id. (This statement refers to the requirement in Ohio's bad actor law that a permit
applicant exhibit "sufficient reliability, expertise and competence" to operate a hazardous waste
facility. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(A) (Baldwin 1995)). According to the story, the
Attorney General's findings mean that the incinerator operators will be required to seek a
permit modification reflecting the changes in ownership, "a process that will offer opponents of
the controversial plant another chance to scuttle the operation," which has been challenged as
being too close to both a source of drinking water and an elementary school. Brown, Plain
Dealer at 5B. This news story strikingly depicts how the permit approval process under a bad
actor statute can become intertwined with community sentiments regarding a pending project.
Notice that if community fears about health hazards are warranted, federal, state, or local
environmental laws will likely ensure that the controversial facility is not built on the proposed
site, as these laws are designed primarily to protect human health. However, bad actor statutes
may allow state officials to respond to irrational citizen concerns related to the siting of waste
facilities in their communities by manipulating loose standards to deny permits to facilities that
have become the target of public outcry.
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Furthermore, if bad actor laws are being manipulated to further protectionist and other non-environmental aims, environmentalists may have a right to be disgruntled. Since the beginnings of the
environmental movement in the early 1970s, environmentalism has
often been a front for more unworthy causes. For example, those opposed to development have often hidden behind the environmental
movement to ensure that specific projects did not proceed.116 In the
name of preserving natural habitats or protecting the environment,
those satisfied with the status quo have identified endangered species
or negative environmental impacts which have stopped their
development projects in their tracks, costing enormous amounts of
money, but all in the name of the "public good." Adopting bad actor
statutes to further non-environmental goals in the name of protecting
public health, welfare, and the environment manipulates the environmental
cause and undermines the laws themselves.
Environmental issues are highly political, highly expensive, and environmentalists' success in passing protective laws comes often at the
expense of strong business interests.' 7 Thus, assuming that each
battle to pass a statute in the name of the environment is hard won, it
would be wasteful, from an environmentalist's perspective, to expend
scarce resources and political good will to pass laws that actually
serve other purposes." 8 If bad actor statutes are fought for and won
in the name of the environment, but implemented mainly to serve
protectionist or other non-environmental goals, they are won at the
eventual expense of environmental protection itself.

116. See generally William Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, Harper's 49
(Dec. 1977).
117. See Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Feb. 23, 1995). This bill would require federal agencies issuing environmental regulations to
engage in cost-benefit analysis with respect to any rule with annual compliance costs of more
than $25 million. The background to this bill cites estimates that environmental compliance
costs will exceed $180 billion by the year 2000. It also suggests that the bill is based on a 'Tear
that the federal government has entered into a reckless, multi-billion dollar will-o-the-wisp
chase in search of illusory benefits at the public's expense." Congressional Press Release,
Federal Document Clearing House (Feb. 26, 1995).
118. It could be that bad actor laws are actually quite easy to pass, since they do not necessarily impose high costs on industry, and their pro-environment label may be appealing to the
public. However, even if this is true, these laws may still take the place of more substantive
environmental protection laws since legislators can support a bad actor law without political
cost and then "check off" their debt to environmentalists and pro-environmental constituents for
the legislative session.
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This Note acknowledges that the goal of environmental protection is an important one, and accepts that bad actor statutes can play
a critical role in accomplishing that goal. However, broadly drawn
bad actor statutes may not be the ideal vehicle. As argued in this
Note, bad actor statutes that base permit disqualification on crimes
and violations unrelated to the environment are suspect from both a
constitutional and policy perspective. These broad-based bad actor
statutes lend themselves to misuse in advance of protectionist goals
and NIMBYism, which can thwart the ultimate goal of environmental
protection. The ideal bad actor statute is one that limits its focus to
applicants with a history of environmental crimes." 9 The following
Parts demonstrate that bad actor statutes can be narrowly tailored to
achieve environmental goals. Parts IV and V set forth the aims and
terms of a model statute to guide both state and federal lawmakers in
crafting reasonable, efficacious, and fair bad actor statutes.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF AN IDEAL BAD ACTOR STATUTE

Not all bad actor laws are vulnerable to misuse or subject to
constitutional flaws in the ways described above. Some, for instance,
are limited in scope solely to environmental crimes. 120 As described
above, Oklahoma's bad actor law states that its purpose is to protect
121
public health and safety and the environment of the state.
Accordingly, the statute prescribes a permit denial only for violations
related to hazardous waste handling, a history of noncompliance with
environmental laws, or an affiliation with any person with such a
record. 122 Oklahoma's statute is exemplary not only because it states
its goals clearly and directly, but also because its clear nexus between

119. The Author acknowledges that some states may indeed face a genuine threat of
infiltration of their waste industry by organized crime. For these states, adopting a broadly
drawn statute aimed directly at combating that threat is both a necessary and reasonable
approach to an identified problem. See Trade Waste Management, 780 F.2d at 238-39 (noting
that New Jersey has a compelling interest in "protecting the sensitive waste disposal business
from the influence of organized crime"). Additionally, a broad bad actor law promotes
environmental protection by ensuring that organized criminals do not violate environmental
regulations to advance their economic interests.
120. See, for example, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 299.518-.519 (West Supp. 1994); 27A
Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-109 (West Supp. 1995); 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6018.503(c) (Purdon
1993).
121. See note 32 and accompanying text.
122. 27A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-109(A) (West Supp. 1995).
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failure to adhere to environmental laws in the past and propensity to
disregard those laws in the future supports the statute's goals.
The ideal bad actor statute is, similarly, narrowly tailored to
accomplish an express environmental objective, containing specific
language restricting the discretion of those implementing the law.
Thus, this ideal statute limits the possibility that the statute will be
misused to advance nonenvironmental goals. An ideal bad actor
statute should contain a purpose section, specifically delineating the
goals sought to be achieved by the statute. It should establish a
strong nexus between the type of bad actors to be identified and the
disqualifying factors, and should base permit denials on a history of
specific occurrences or acts, rather than vague standards. The ideal
statute should also provide procedures for a hearing in the event that
a permit is denied. Finally, a model bad actor statute should
encompass all permitting activities that the relevant environmental
agency administers. 123
A. The Purpose Section
There are distinct advantages to drafting a purpose section for
bad actor statutes. A statement of the statute's purpose would clearly
express to enforcement officials, the judiciary, and the public the goals
sought to be achieved by its passage and implementation. Thus, the
purpose section may serve to limit discretionary behavior by those
who apply the statute's provisions to specific applicants. It may also
provide a focus for judicial appeal should an aggrieved applicant
complain that a permitting decision does not comport with the defined
goals of the law. Finally, designing laws which state their purpose in
a clear and straightforward manner reflects good lawmaking policy; it
will prevent misperception of statutory goals by the community and
will assist lawmakers in obtaining genuine community endorsement

123. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address all of the potential elements of an ideal
bad actor law. For example, some lawmakers may wish to allow applicants with histories of
environmental noncompliance to obtain permits if they have since shown evidence of rehabilitation. Allowing permitting officials to consider mitigating circumstances may be appropriate as
long as the circumstances are clearly and specifically defined and the process for weighing such
factors against the potentially disqualifying factors is explicitly spelled out in the statute.
Several states' statutes allow evidence of rehabilitation or mitigating factors. See, for example,
Ind. Code Ann. § 13-7-10.2-4(b) (Burns 1990); Ky. Rev. Ann. Stat. § 224.40-330(1)(d)(6) (1991);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 115.076, subd. 4 (West Supp. 1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 17-17-505(3) (Law. Coop Supp. 1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-133.1 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-4-4.2(E)
(1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 23-29-04(14) (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3734.44(C) (Baldwin
1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-10(b)(3) (Supp. 1994); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-96-300(C)(7) (Law.
Co-op Supp. 1993); Va. Code § 10.1-1409(8)(f) (1993).
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of their work. An ideal bad actor statute will contain a purpose
section indicating that the sole goal of the law is to ensure protection
of the environment by identifying permit applicants who have
habitually violated environmental requirements and by prohibiting
these applicants from obtaining a waste handling permit.
B. Strong Nexus between Ends and Means
Perhaps even more critical to the drafting of an ideal bad actor
statute is the careful determination of disqualifying factors that
indicate a propensity to violate environmental standards and
requirements.1 24 In making this determination, the lawmaker should
first consult available studies, statistics, and commonly available
knowledge regarding the tendency of certain kinds of applicants to
disregard environmental laws. 125 Second, lawmakers should denote as
disqualifying factors only those characteristics or prior bad acts
deemed sufficiently probative of future bad acts to mandate a permit
denial in every case, regardless of the individual applicant involved.
This will ensure that the bad actor statute only targets those permit
applicants whose histories are strongly indicative of a predilection for
disobeying environmental laws. Finally, a bad actor law should only
require information on those entities most prone to contribute to the
applicant's potential violation of environmental laws. Adherence to

124. Furthermore, an ideal bad actor law will seek only that information which is critical to
its final decision, rather than requiring applicants to disclose information about activities that
will not be considered in the permit approval process. Limiting an applicant's disclosure burden
solely to such information which is vital to the permit approval determination ensures that
applicants will not be supplying government agencies with information that may taint agency
consideration of the permit application, even though the agency is not formally allowed to
consider such information in denying a permit. The potential for such abuse is evident in laws
like the Paxson/Synar bill, which would require applicants to disclose information about "any
judgment of liability or conviction" rendered against them. H.R. 3271, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(Aug. 2, 1991). However, under this bill, an applicant can only be found ineligible for EPA
benefits upon conviction of any federal environmental law. Id. See note 39. Similarly,
Delaware's bad actor law requires disclosure of all felonies committed by the applicant and
other identified persons, but limits a permit denial to a finding that "the applicant has operated
... a facility in a manner which casts substantial doubt on the ability or willingness of the
applicant to operate the facility for which a permit is being requested in a manner that will
protect the health and welfare of the citizens of Delaware." 7 Del. Code Ann. § 7904(2) (Supp.
1994) (emphasis added). Delaware's law seems to require more information than the agency
needs to make a permit approval decision.
125. In states such as New Jersey, this analysis could validly consider the strong presence
of organized crime in the waste industry and the particular likelihood that applicants associated
with the organized crime world will put profit ahead of law-abiding behavior.
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these guidelines can ensure a strong nexus between statutory means
and ends.
C. Precise,Definitive Standards
Bad actor statutes should focus on specific elements in an
applicant's history as disqualifying factors rather than relying on such
indeterminate characteristics as reliability or good character. Use of
vague terms in a bad actor statute creates room for undesirable discretionary behavior by enforcement officials, and arguably provides
inadequate notice to the applicant of what kinds of activity will later
result in a permit denial.126

Lawmakers can reduce ambiguous

standards to a set of specific acts which, if engaged in by the
applicant, will indicate that the applicant should not be granted a
permit. 127
D. HearingProcedures
All bad actor statutes should make available a process through
which an applicant may appeal a permit denial.12s Individualized
hearings will ensure each applicant that the agency's decision regarding its permit application was fair and procedurally correct. Hearing
procedures for a permit denial under a bad actor statute should differ
from the procedures for a standard permit denial. This is due to the
fact that the latter type of permit denial only implicates technical or
other insufficiencies in the permit application. On the other hand,
implicit in a denial under a bad actor statute is an allegation that the
applicant has a record of environmental compliance problems and
cannot be trusted to operate a facility according to environmental
requirements. Thus, a hearing may need to be conducted before

126. Notice is an essential element of fairness, as it provides citizens with an opportunity to
modify their behavior in order to avoid the consequences of a particular law.
127. For arguments that ambiguous character standards are also inappropriate in other
fields, see Stephen A. Sharp and Don Lively, Can the Broadcasterin the Black Hat Ride Again?
"Good Character"Requirement for Broadcast Licensees, 32 Fed. Comm. L. J. 173, 202 (1980)
(concluding that the FCC should eliminate character as a qualification and focus instead on the
more reliable indicator of specific acts of misconduct); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Characteras a
Professional Credential, 94 Yale L. J. 491, 497, 500-01 (1985) (explaining that the character
requirement for admission to the bar was historically used to exclude women, Jews, and persons
of foreign parentage from the legal profession).
128. Many bad actor statutes already contain hearing procedures. Hearing procedures can
be a critical safeguard in ensuring that the ideal bad actor law, once narrowly drawn, is also
correctly applied to individual situations.
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denial 129 since information regarding the denial may reach the public
forum and damage the applicant's reputation, which in many states is
protected by the state constitution. 130
E. BroadApplication to All PermittingPrograms
For bad actor statutes to have a strong impact on environmental protection, they must focus on the entire gamut of environmental permitting, rather than solely on the waste treatment and
disposal industry. 3' It is doubtful that any recidivistic tendency of
environmental bad actors is confined solely to the solid and hazardous
waste industry. While it may be true that the waste industry, with
its promise of high profit margins, draws entities desiring to make
money at the expense of environmental protection, compliance with
environmental standards will also dramatically raise the cost of doing
business for those with permits to discharge air or water pollutants as
well. If applicable to all types of permits, bad actor statutes would
help to identify and weed out all entities inclined to give profit takes
precedence over compliance with environmental laws.

129. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that "when welfare is
discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural
due process"); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (determining that before the state of
Georgia could deprive an uninsured driver of his or her driver's license after an accident, the
state must provide a hearing to determine whether there was a reasonable possibility that a
judgment would be rendered against the driver as a result of the accident). But see Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974) (concluding that post-termination hearing procedures
adequately protect a government employee's right to procedural due process); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (finding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to
termination of disability benefits under the Social Security Act).
130. Many states provide constitutional protection for their citizens' reputational interests.
See, for example, Ala. Const., Art. I, § 13; Ark. Const., Art. II, § 2; Conn. Const., Art. I, § 10; Del.
Const., pmbl.; Ill. Const., Art. I, § 12; Ind. Const., Art. I, § 12; Kan. Const., Bill of Rights, § 18;
La. Const., Art. I, § 22; Me. Const., Art. I, § 19; N.C. Const., Art. I, § 18; N.D. Const., Art. I, § 1;
Oh. Const., Art. I, § 16; Okla. Const., Art. II, § 6; Or. Const., Art. I, § 10; Pa. Const., Art. I, § 1;
S.D. Const., Art. VI, § 20; Utah Const., Art. I, § 11; W. Va. Const., Art. III, § 17; Wyo. Const., Art
I, § 8.
However, in Chemical Waste Management, the Indiana Supreme Court suggested that a
post-deprivation hearing would be adequate to protect the reputational interest of a waste
handler because reputation is not an essential component of functioning in that profession. 643
N.E.2d at 339.
As discussed in Part III.A.1.c., the Franklin County Circuit Court in Kentucky held that
Kentucky's bad actor law did not deprive the plaintiff permit applicant of any interest protected
by either the United States or Kentucky constitutions, and that the plaintiff was thus not
entitled to procedural due process. See Attwoods, slip op. at 13-17.
131. Most state bad actor laws currently focus on solid and hazardous waste. See notes 911 and accompanying text.
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V. A MODEL BAD ACTOR STATUTE

The model statute set forth below draws on the strengths of
current and proposed bad actor laws. Yet it is narrowly tailored to
achieve the specific goal of identifying repeat environmental offenders; it leaves little room for undesirable discretionary behavior in
advance of protectionist or punitive goals. Furthermore, it ensures
each applicant for an environmental permit fair treatment and a predictable result. It is nevertheless broad enough to reach a wide array
of environmental offenders and to prevent them from continuing to
endanger the environment through the disregard of environmental
standards.
MODEL BAD ACTOR STATUTE

Section 1. Purpose
The purpose of this statute is to require examination of the
history of all permit applicants in order to identify applicants with a
record of past environmental violations. In order to ensure the continued protection of the public health, safety, and welfare and the
environment of this state, this statute provides that all permit
applicants who, based on the standards below, have exhibited a
propensity to disregard environmental laws shall be denied permits to
operate facilities within this state.
Section 2: Disclosure Statement
All applicants for a permit to discharge pollutants under the
environmental laws of this state shall submit a disclosure statement
to the permitting authority. The disclosure statement shall include
the following information:
a list of all corporate officers and directors, stockholders
(a)
owning at least 50132 percent of the company's stock or assets, and persons responsible for the daily operation of the proposed facility; and
132. Fifty percent is not a magic number; it is certainly possible that individuals with a
smaller investment in the company might have a say in management of company affairs and
thus might contribute to a company's violation of environmental regulations. However, investors with a stake in the corporation representing at least half of the company's stock or assets
definitely should be included in the scope of the ideal bad actor statute, as these individuals will,
by virtue of their majority ownership in a company, be able to actively participate in and control
the daily operations of the company.
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(b)
a list of all violations of any state or federal environmental law, regulation, permit, license, or order occurring in the past
five years, which resulted in a conviction or civil or administrative
penalties for the corporate permit applicant or any member of the
corporate entity required to be listed on the disclosure statement.
Section 3. Permit Denial
The agency shall issue a proposed determination to deny any
permit application upon a finding that:
(1)
the applicant or any person required to be listed on the
disclosure statement has exhibited a propensity to disregard environmental requirements, based upon two or more violations as described in Section 2(b); or
(2)
the applicant withheld or misrepresented any material
information required to be included in the disclosure statement.
Section 4. Hearing
If the agency proposes to deny a permit under this Act, the
permit applicant may request a hearing on the merits of the agency's
proposed determination. The hearing shall be conducted prior to the,
133
agency's final action on the permit application.

The model statute above represents a bare-bones approach to
the problem of environmental bad actors,134 and admittedly leaves
little flexibility for case-by-case determination. However, it is just
such a determination that this statute seeks to avoid. Once agency
officials are in the position to make decisions based on the individual,
rather than on pre-determined norms, there is room for unfairness
and inconsistency in the application of the law.
Furthermore,

133. The hearing procedures furiiished by the ideal bad actor statute are those necessary to
ensure that the agency has made a correct determination to deny a permit application given the
provisions of Section 3 - Permit Denial. See note 127 and accompanying text.
134. See note 122.
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overbroad bad actor laws become a likely conduit through which
private and public sentiment can work to prevent the siting of
facilities for non-environmental reasons, such as protectionism or
"NIMBYism."
The statute above could be adopted at either the state or
federal level, and would be most effective if adopted at both levels in a
relatively uniform manner. Adoption of a similar bad actor law
applying to all permitting activities of the EPA, in addition to
adoption of bad actor laws in every state, would establish a network of
bad actor laws that would prevent proven bad actors from gravitating
to more lenient states or areas in order to avoid scrutiny and to continue to profit from disregard of environmental laws.
Some commentators have stressed the importance of adopting
bad actor statutes solely at the federal level. 135 These commentators
have suggested that a unified federal program would do away with
inconsistencies between states and would accordingly decrease transactions costs for companies operating in more than one state. 136
Others have proclaimed that adoption of a bad actor statute at the
federal level would boost the effectiveness of the "EPA's deterrence
arsenal.' '3 7 However, it must be recognized that many important
permitting activities occur at the state and local levels.138 Thus, a
federal law which failed to recognize this fact would leave a gaping
hole through which many bad actors would escape.
VI. CONCLUSION

Bad actor statutes can play a critical role in environmental
protection by screening out entities who have proven through prior
behavior their inability or unwillingness to comply with environmental standards. Yet in drafting such statutes, lawmakers must be
careful not to create a law that is subject to manipulation in pursuit of
nonenvironmental goals. The battle to pass environmental laws that
are acceptable both to industry and environmentalists presents too

135. Strock and Runkel, 15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 562 (cited in note 7); Drucker, 2 U. Balt.
J. Envir. L. at 92-93 (cited in note 113).
136. Drucker, 2 U. Balt. J. Envir. L. at 92-93.
137. Strock and Runkel, 15 Harv. Envir. L. Rev. at 562 (cited in note 7).
138. For a discussion of state and federal permitting under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, which governs the disposal of solid and hazardous waste, see Donna L. Kolar,
Practical Advice for Permitting a Waste Disposal Facility, in Theodore L. Garrett, ed.,
Environmental Law Manual 137, 141-42 (Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and
Environmental Law, American Bar Association, 1992).
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great a challenge to accept "environmental protection" laws that may
actually be designed to further other purposes. Narrowly tailored bad
actor statutes that craft a careful nexus between disqualifying factors
and the goal of weeding out proven bad actors, while avoiding the use
of vague, manipulable standards, will ensure progress towards the
goal of environmental protection in a fair and efficient manner.
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